Intelligence Gathering: Strategy For Security Of Lives And Property

Intelligence Gathering: Strategy For Security Of Lives And Property

Security Paper delivered by Oladayo Ogunbowale

4th Nov, 2018

Introduction

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of collected information.

Governments try to protect three things regarding intelligence gathering: their intelligence personnel, their intelligence facilities & resources and their intelligence operations, every security conscious organisation or group should do same. RATCLIFFE (2008), listed community participation as a key element in any contemporary strategy designed to promote law and order.

Collecting intelligence to build up a detailed knowledge of threats to the country is at the heart of Secret service work. Security intelligence (SI) is the information relevant to protecting an organization from external and inside threats as well as the processes, policies and tools designed to gather and analyze that information. People tend to associate intelligence with crime prevention; meaning probably that the availability of timely intelligence can prevent the occurrence of crime.

DEFINING INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of collected information. It is a specialized information product that provides the State or an adversary with information required to further its national interests. One of the most important functions of intelligence is the reduction of the ambiguity inherent in the observation of external activities. In the most obvious case, adversary intelligence organizations may seek information concerning military capabilities or other matters that directly threaten the national security of the State.

In each of these cases, the information sought may provide the adversary with an edge and might allow him to implement a well-developed strategy to reach his goals. In most cases, the development of an intelligence product involves collecting information from a number of different sources. In some cases, information may be disseminated immediately upon collection based upon operational necessity and potential impact on current operations. This type of raw intelligence is usually based on fragmentary information about fast-breaking events and may contain substantial inaccuracies or uncertainties that must be resolved through subsequent report and analysis. Finished intelligence products contain information that is compared, analyzed, and weighted to allow the development of conclusions. Finished intelligence is produced through analytical review in the intelligence process. The intelligence process confirms a fact or set of facts through a multiplicity of sources to reduce the chance of erroneous conclusions and susceptibility to deception.

Intelligence is divided into strategic and operational intelligence. Strategic intelligence provides policy makers with the information needed to make national policy or decisions of long-lasting importance. Strategic intelligence collection often requires integrating information concerning politics, military affairs, economics, societal interactions, and technological developments. It typically evolves over a long period of time and results in the development of intelligence studies and estimates. Operational intelligence is concerned with current or near-term events. It is used to determine the current and projected capability of a program or operation on an ongoing basis and does not result in long-term projections. Most intelligence activities support the development of operational intelligence.

THE PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

Broadly speaking, people tend to associate intelligence with crime prevention; meaning probably that the availability of timely intelligence can prevent the occurrence of crime. But is this perspective completely true? To gain more insight, let’s examine the following widely held views:

i. That intelligence services are solely responsible for the generation and dissemination of intelligence, for that reason they must be held accountable whenever any breach of security occurs;

ii. That intelligence failure occurs when intelligence agencies give wrong or misleading information or when actionable intelligence is not received on time; and

iii. That various security agencies have their statutory responsibilities and must exclusively focus on their mandates, even in the face of national emergencies which demand greater collaboration and dynamism in handling issues.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle is the process through which intelligence is obtained, produced, and made available to users. In depicting this cycle, the United States Intelligence Community uses a five-step process. Other nations may describe this cycle differently; however, the process is largely the same. The steps in the intelligence cycle are depicted in the following illustration:

1. Planning and Direction: The first step in the cycle, planning and direction, involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of a need for data to the final delivery of the intelligence product to the consumer. The process consists of identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence requirements, translating requirements into observables, preparing collection plans, issuing requests for information collection, production, and dissemination, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data. In this step specific collection capabilities are tasked, based on the type of information required, the susceptibility of the targeted activity to various types of collection activity, and the availability of collection assets.

2. Collection: includes both acquiring information and provisioning that information to processing and production elements. The collection process encompasses the management of various activities, including developing collection guidelines that ensure optimal use of available intelligence resources. Intelligence collection requirements are developed to meet the needs of potential consumers. Based upon identified intelligence, requirements collection activities are given specific taskings to collect information. These taskings are generally redundant and may use a number of different intelligence disciplines for collection activities. Tasking redundancy compensates for the potential loss or failure of a collection asset. It ensures that the failure of a collection asset is compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the collection need. The use of different types of collection systems contributes to redundancy. It also allows the collection of different types of information that can be used to confirm or disprove potential assessments. Collection operations depend on secure, rapid, redundant, and reliable communications to allow for data exchange and to provide opportunities for cross-cueing of assets and tip-off exchanges between assets. Once collected, information is correlated and forwarded for processing and production.

3. Processing: The third step, processing, is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for the production of intelligence. In this process, incoming information is converted into formats that can be readily used by intelligence analysts in producing intelligence. Processing may include such activities as translation and reduction of intercepted messages into written format to permit detailed analysis and comparison with other information. Other types of processing include video production, photographic processing, and correlation of information collected by technical intelligence platforms.

4. Production: The fourth step, production, is the process of analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and integrating raw data and information into finished intelligence products for known or anticipated purposes and applications. The product may be developed from a single source or from all-source collection and databases. To be effective, intelligence production must focus on the consumer’s needs. It should be objective, timely, and most importantly accurate. As part of the production process, the analyst must eliminate information that is redundant, erroneous, or inapplicable to the intelligence requirement. As a result of the analytical effort, the analyst may determine that additional collection operations are required to fill in gaps left by previous collection or existing intelligence databases. The final intelligence product must provide the consumer with an understanding of the subject area, and draw analytical conclusions supported by available data.

5. Dissemination: The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination. Dissemination is the conveyance of intelligence to the consumer in a usable form. Intelligence can be provided to the consumer in a wide range of formats including verbal reports, written reports, imagery products, and intelligence databases. Dissemination can be accomplished through physical exchanges of data and through interconnected data and communications networks.

Knowledge of an adversary’s collection methods and patterns allows the program manager to develop effective countermeasures that hide or distort indicators.

According to one estimate, over 100 countries currently conduct intelligence operations against the United States. Adversary intelligence organizations place a high priority on the acquisition of scientific and technical information and target the United States because of its pre-eminence in many high-technology areas. The United States Government, American corporations, and U.S. universities have been targeted by intelligence organizations seeking scientific and technical intelligence. The United States hosts more science and technology (S&T) officials, defense attaches, and identified intelligence officers than any other industrialized nation in the world.

The 1992 Open Skies Treaty also poses an imagery collection threat. The treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. The treaty was negotiated between the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact as a means to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities. Observation flights can be performed from aircraft provided by the observing nation, the observed nation, or a third participating party. Aircraft can be equipped with panoramic and framing cameras capable of a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters, video cameras with a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters, infrared line scanning devices with ground resolution of no better than 50 centimeters, and synthetic aperture radar systems with impulse response rate resolutions no better than 3 meters. Ground resolutions of 50 centimeters or less provide significant detailed information for an imagery analyst. Using the imagery derived from Open Skies flights analysts will be able to identify particular types of equipment by type and capability, and perform detailed analyses of rail, port, industrial, and military facilities.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

Open source intelligence involves the use of materials available to the public by intelligence agencies and other adversaries. Some analysts have estimated that the Soviet Union derived up to 90 percent of its intelligence from open source information. With the proliferation of electronic databases, it has become easier to collate large quantities of data, and structure information to meet the needs of the adversary collector. Open source information can often provide extremely valuable information concerning an organization’s activities and capabilities. Frequently, open source material can provide information on organizational dynamics, technical processes, and research activities not available in any other form. When open source data is compiled, it is often possible to derive classified data or trade secrets. This is particularly true in the case of studies published in technical journals. A significant understanding of research and development efforts can often be derived by analyzing journal articles published by different members of a research organization. Finally, open source information is generally more timely and may be the only information available in the early stages of a crisis or emergency.

Open source intelligence collection does have limitations. Often articles in military or scientific journals represent a theoretical or desired capability rather than an actual capability. Censorship may also limit the publication of key data needed to arrive at a full understanding of an adversary’s actions, or the press may be used as part of a conscious deception effort.

Computer Intrusion for Collection Operations

It is unclear to what extent foreign intelligence services are using computer hackers to obtain proprietary data or sensitive government information, or whether they have developed the capability to use computer intrusion techniques to disrupt telecommunications activities. The KGB did, however, sponsor computer intrusion activities by the Hannover Hackers, and there is no reason to believe that these efforts have ceased. The Hannover Hackers were able to access at least 28 Government computer systems, and obtain data from them. They sold this data to the KGB. While none of this data was classified, much of it was sensitive, and classified information could potentially be derived from comparing this information with other data. It has also been alleged that the KGB has been involved in similar efforts with other hacker groups and that these operations included the remote introduction of logic bombs and other malicious code. There is little doubt that many foreign intelligence services could obtain hese capabilities if they wished. The ability of a group of Dutch hackers to obtain sensitive information from U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force computer networks during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm serves as an example of this potential for access. Between April 1990 and May 1991, this group was able to penetrate computer systems at 34 different facilities. The group obtained information on logistics operations, equipment movement schedules, and weapons development programs. Information from one of the penetrated computer systems directly supported Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations.

A knowledge of the adversary’s analytical biases can be used to develop deception programs that deceive the adversary by confirming erroneous perceptions.

COMPOSITION OF NIGERIA’S SECURITY SECTOR

The Nigerian State operates a multi-dimensional security system designed to checkmate internal security threats and contain external aggression. The security structure is extensive, robust and all-inclusive. It is made up of State Security providers, Government Security Management and Oversight bodies, Non-State

Security Sector Providers and the Civil Society. This section will give an overview of these critical security actors and institutions. It will identify state and non-state power structures in the country, the decision-makers, potential reformers and possible devious elements in government and civil society.

a. State Security Providers: National Security and Defence as we are all aware, is in the Exclusive List of the 1999 Constitution. Therefore, the

President and Commander-In-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces superintends over these very strategic elements of the Constitution. He gives directions, defines and guides national security and defense policies. His vision remains the driving force for national security objectives where institutions of state draw their inspiration to implement desired procedures that enhance public security and safety. The fight against current wave of terrorism and other vices are borne by these agencies. They include Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA),

Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force, Nigeria Police Force, State Security Service, National Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigeria Customs Service, Nigerian Prison Service, National Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigeria Immigration Service, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission. Beyond the statutory responsibilities as expounded in the various laws and provisions establishing these state institutions, the multifaceted nature of terrorism, arms proliferation, and kidnapping further raises the need for synergy amongst the security services in order to achieve the overall national security objectives.

b. Government Security Management and Oversight Bodies: As it obtains in other developed climes, the Nigerian Legislature plays a major role in national security. The Committees of the National Assembly which have oversight responsibilities on national security issues include, Committees on Defence, National Security and Intelligence, Army, Navy, Air Force, Police Affairs, Drugs, Narcotics and Financial Crimes and Foreign Affairs. Other important bodies with direct or remote security mandates includes, the Police Service Commission, Supreme Courts, Appeal Courts and other disputes resolution and decision-making mechanisms.

c. Civil Society: Civil society groups serve a variety of functions in any state. In addition to monitoring the performance of security actors, they articulate the public demand for safety and security. In some cases, particularly where capacity may be limited, civil society and other non-state actors may serve functions that provide security and justice to local communities. In this case, civil society actors may include professional organizations, policy analysts (e.g. think tanks and universities) advocacy groups, human rights commissions, and Ombudsmen, NGOs, the media and such other actors. Women organizations in Nigeria have grown so strong that they now offer information on gender-based violence and other issues that are not necessarily gathered by State Security infrastructure.

d. Non-State Security Actors: Non-state security actors in Nigeria encompass a broad range of groups with varying degrees of legal status and legitimacy. For instance, the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) are non-violent state actors. The informal and customary legal systems are equally integral parts of the security sector that have tremendous impact on how people perceive and experience security. Also, Private security companies, vigilante groups, citizens’ associations and other locally based safety and security groups are examples of Non-State Actors. Some of these actors have explicit links to police services and may be authorized by the state, by law or custom, to engage in security activities. Informal and traditional justice systems or community watch groups may have a stabilizing effect in conflict and post-conflict settings. For instance customary and Islamic laws have being recognized as a source of law in Nigeria. Hence, issues such as inheritance, marriages, religion and so forth can be determined by the culture of an area. However, unaccountable non-state actors or illicit power structures may engender human rights abuses and facilitate inappropriate links between the private and public security sectors and political parties, state agencies, paramilitary organizations, organized crime and so forth. These actors may be providers of security as well as sources of insecurity. For instance the Bakassi Boys, Odua Peoples’ Congress (OPC) and Hisbah are acclaimed security providers but also constitute a major source of insecurity in Nigeria.

The composition of the security sector as highlighted above contradicts the generally held notion that law enforcement agencies are the sole custodian of the nation’s security system. As a result their performances or failures are seen as exclusively responsible for insecurity in Nigeria. Well, this ideology is only true to a degree. While advocating for Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) as an ideal model of policing and security enforcement to the Australian Government, Jerry

RATCLIFFE (2008), listed community participation as a key element in any contemporary strategy designed to promote law and order. Also, one of the tragic lessons from the 9/11 Commission Report is that the local communities were not fully incorporated in the security system of the United States prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Homeland Security has since developed and implemented several community-participation policing models in the United States.

Although cooperation involving the local communities and various elements in the security sector is sacrosanct to the attainment of national security objectives,

Michael Chandler (2001) observes that in many countries, similar levels of cooperation are not necessarily the norm between the judiciary, police and other agencies charged with national security. According to Chandler, it was the need to improve interagency cooperation during the Cold War that made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to develop the acronym “C3I” which was the abbreviation for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence.

Chandler observed that the same acronym has a place in today’s counter terrorism vocabulary, but it should now be redefined as Cooperation, Communication, Coordination, and Information-Sharing which is relevant to the agencies responsible for combating crime. This position is apt, especially in climes where security management is all encompassing with all segments of the society playing significant roles in crime control.

EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY THEORY AND CRIME MANAGEMENT

According to Thomas Craig (2006), an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain, who share a set of beliefs that provides value-based foundation for the action(s) of their members. Members of an epistemic community are guided by common sets of principles towards the attainment of the goal(s) of that community. Deriving from this theory therefore, law enforcement agencies are members of an epistemic community; members of the judiciary are in the same epistemic community. The legislature, media, and civil society groups are all different epistemic groups.

Therefore, the failure of one epistemic community in the security sector to harmonize its activities to support national security objectives have direct or remote consequence(s) to the attainment of desired goals.

Consequently, to accomplish outlined objectives, there must be strong cooperation between the various components of the security sector, the security agencies being the crux of the sector.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHARING FOR EFFECTIVE POLICING IN NIGERIA

Intelligence gathering is a necessary tool law enforcement agencies needs for countering criminal activities in society. It could be directed towards containing crime, to aid policy formulation and implementation, and monitoring the execution of government projects and programmes. Data collection, analysis, dissemination and utilization are key components of the intelligence process. Over the years, the Department of State Services (DSS) has developed robust structures which enhance its collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) through intelligence-sharing. With offices in the 36 States and 774 Local Government

Areas of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force remain one of the major consumers of intelligence emanating from the DSS.

This collaborative effort has led to greater synergy of purpose between both agencies. Indeed, the war on terror is still ongoing, but for the collaboration amongst the security services, Nigeria may have been overrun by now. The counterterrorism/insurgency programmes is yielding remarkable results because they are intelligence-driven. Indeed, the Service has continued to acquire capabilities in the area of human and technical intelligence, which is aiding our collective efforts to contain terrorism and other violent crimes in Nigeria.

Below are some specific platforms which are aiding intelligence-sharing amongst the security agencies; Attitudinal Change: As highlighted earlier since the return to democracy in 1999, the various security agencies embarked on several reform programme, to drive attitudinal change amongst officers and men of the services.

Although this process still on, it has help to improve the Camaraderie amongst all categories of personnel; Promoting the Concept of Community-Based Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP): All crimes are usually hatched, planned and executed within the community. Therefore the community is central and critical to security management and law enforcement. In this regard, the efforts of the DSS, NPF and other stakeholders is contributing appreciably to sensitization and education of the community. Indeed this efforts has helped to develop capacities amongst non-state actors to know the different dimensions that constitute threats, to know appropriate individuals to report to or feed with information, to know how to use basic investigation techniques, to understand basic security and safety procedures which may include how to avoid certain dangers, and getting them to also become peer educators.

The Joint Task Forces: The various Joint Task Forces in flashpoints which comprises of the DSS, the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Police Force, National Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and other critical stakeholders. The successes recorded so far by the JTFs would not have been possible without the robust understanding between amongst the agencies in each Task Force unit.

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

Security intelligence (SI) is the information relevant to protecting an organization from external and inside threats as well as the processes, policies and tools designed to gather and analyze that information.

Intelligence, in this context, is actionable information that provides an organization with decision support and possibly a strategic advantage. SI is a comprehensive approach that integrates multiple processes and practices designed to protect the organization.

Elements of security intelligence include:

1. Log management: The collective processes and policies used to administer and facilitate the generation, transmission, analysis, storage and ultimate disposal of the large volumes of log data created within an information system.
2. Security information and event management (SIEM): An approach to security management that seeks to provide a holistic view of an organization’s information technology (IT) security. Most SIEM systems deploy multiple collection agents to gather security-related events from end-user devices, servers, network equipment and specialized security equipment like firewalls, antivirus or intrusion prevention systems. The collectors forward events to a centralized management console, which performs inspections and flags anomalies.
3. Network behavior anomaly detection (NBAD): The continuous monitoring of a network for unusual events or trends. An NBAD program tracks critical network characteristics in real time and generates an alarm if a strange event or trend is detected that could indicate the presence of a threat. NBAD is an integral part of network behavior analysis (NBA).
4. Risk management: The process of identifying, assessing and controlling threats to an organization’s capital and earnings. Such threats include financial uncertainty, legal liabilities, strategic management errors, accidents, natural disasters and information technology (IT) security threats.
5. Network forensics: The capture, recording, and analysis of network events for the purpose of discovering the source of security attacks or other problem incidents. “Catch-it-as-you-can” systems capture all packets passing through a certain traffic point, store the data and perform analysis subsequently in batch mode. “Stop, look and listen” systems perform a rudimentary analysis in memory and save only certain data for future analysis.

GATHERING INTELLIGENCE

Collecting intelligence to build up a detailed knowledge of threats to the country is at the heart of Secret service work.

The assessment and investigation process helps us to make decisions about how to respond to these threats and what protective measures to take. Our judgement about the scale of various threats and how we allocate our resources in response are subject to validation by necessary security outfits.

Why use secret intelligence

Although publicly available information is helpful for background purposes, usually the best way to find out about the threat that some organisations and individuals pose is to obtain secret intelligence about their activities. One gathers this information and uses it to find out about organisations of interest and their key personalities, infrastructure, intentions, plans, and capabilities.

If intelligence is worth recording we ensure that this is done accurately. We clearly mark its origin and authenticity, and ensure that it can be retrieved swiftly. If we assess that a particular threat needs to be investigated, we deploy resources to obtain further intelligence, and we continually adjust our assessments in light of new intelligence or events.

Principal techniques for gathering intelligence are:

1. Covert Human Intelligence Sources or “agents”. Agents are people who are able to provide secret information about a target of an investigation. Agents are not employees;

2. Directed surveillance, such as following and/or observing targets;

3. Interception of communications, such as monitoring emails or phone calls;

4. Communications data (including use of bulk communications data), information about communications, such as “how and when” they were made, which is usually obtained from communications service providers;

5. Bulk personal data, datasets containing information about a large number of people which can be accessed in a targeted way to identify or find information about subject of interest;

6. Intrusive surveillance, such as putting eavesdropping devices in someone’s home or car; and

7. Equipment interference, such as covertly accessing computers or other devices.

All of the techniques used are in accordance with the legal requirements established by the Security Service Act 1989, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA), the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), and the associated Codes of practice. The use and authorisation of each technique is independently scrutinised by the Interception Commissioner (for interception and communications data) and the Intelligence Services Commissioner (for other RIPA and ISA authorisations).

The Security Service Act 1989 makes the Director General responsible for ensuring that there are effective arrangements to control when and how to obtain and disclose information. As well as formal handling arrangements, a major aspect of this control is a system of internal mechanisms, designed to make sure we only investigate genuine threats to national security. These arrangements are designed to allow fast-moving investigations to proceed swiftly, whilst maintaining a high level of compliance.

At any one time one is likely to be conducting many investigations, but only in a very few of the most important ones would one need to use all of the methods of intelligence collection. Eavesdropping, for example, is not only highly intrusive, meaning the case for using it must be strong, but carrying it out securely is also technically complex and resource-intensive. As a result, it is used sparingly.

Necessity and proportionality

When using intrusive techniques to gather intelligence, the underlying aim is always to be effective with the minimum amount of intrusion and in proportion to the threat. Much of the skill of intelligence work lies in finding the right blend of techniques to meet the requirements of an investigation.

It must be proportionate to what it seeks to achieve, meaning the intelligence gain will be sufficiently great to justify the intrusion, as well as any unavoidable “collateral intrusion” against individuals other than the target.

Naturally, people who threaten national security, such as terrorists or spies, are aware that their activities may attract our attention and they will do what they can to prevent us from detecting them. Equally, we try to gather intelligence without our targets realising we have them under investigation. This is not just to avoid compromising our investigations, but also to protect our methods so that we can use them again in the future.

References

1 — Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Compendium of OPSEC Terms, Greenbelt, MD: IOSS, April 1991.

2 — Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, StraJegic Intelligence for American National Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

3 — The Joint Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. June 30. 1991.

4 — Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Compendium of OPSEC Terms, Greenbelt, MD: IOSS, April 1991.

5 — Air Force Pamphlet 200–18, Target Intelligence Handbook: Unclassif ed Targeting Principles, Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, October 1, 1990.

6 — Suzanne Wood, Katherine L. Herbig, and Peter A. W. Lewis, American Espionage, 1945–1989, Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, 1990.

7 — Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Information Architecture for the Battlefield, Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, October 1994.

8 — Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target, New York: William Morrow, 1987.

9 Intelligence Community Staff, Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions, Washington, DC: ICS, June 1989.

10 — William Rosenau,”A Deafening Silence: U.S. Policy and the SIGINT Facility at Lourdes,” Intelligence and National Security, 9:4 (October 1994), pp. 723–734.

11 — Pan chromatic systems produce black and white imagery. ibid

12 — Daniel B. Sibbet, “Commercial Remote-Sensing,” American Intelligence Journal, Spring/Summer 1993, p. 37, and Testimony of Robin Armani before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Public Hearing on Commercial Remote Sensing, November 17. 1993.

13 — On-Site Inspection Agency, “Fact Sheet: The Open Skies Treaty,” May 1993, and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treaty on Open Skies (Official Text), April 10, 1992.

14 — Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Target Intelligence Handbook: Unclassified Targeting Principles, Air Force Pamphlet 200–18, Volume 1, Washington, D.C., 1 October 1990, pp. 18–19.

15 — ibid.. P. 19.

16 — Peter Warren, “Technoterrorists: Growing Links Between Computer Technology and the Seedy Underworld of Terrorism, Organized Crime, and Spying.” Computer Talk, June 19. 1989, D. 52.

17 — Interview: DISA Center for Information System Security, November 3, 1993.

18 — United States Senate, A Lesson of the Gulf War: National Security Requires Computer Security, June 19, 1991, Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC: USGPO.

19. Police Reforms: Intelligence Gathering And Sharing Towards Effective Policing being paper delivered by Mr Ee Ita, Cfr, Mni; Director-General SS at the Two (2)- Day Stakeholders Retreat By Police Service Commission. 30th January, 2014